

Chapter 3 Negotiations to Normalize Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations

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Section 1 Hatoyama's Ascendance to Power

On December 7, 1954, Ichiro Hatoyama, President of the Democratic Party, was appointed as prime minister, following the resignation of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Hatoyama proposed to leave excessively pro-American foreign policy, and promote independent diplomacy instead. Former Prime Minister Yoshida, Hatoyama's greatest political rival, achieved the historical conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Having rival's achievement in mind, newly elected Prime Minister Hatoyama started working on improvement of Japan-Soviet relations, and aimed to accomplish momentous normalization of two nations ⁽¹⁾.

Hatoyama probably would not have worked so vigorously on the normalization of Japan-Soviet relations if Yoshida had smoothly handed over political power to him promised, without giving him the impression of obstruction; as one could see from his anti-communist declaration, issued right after the Second World War, he was an anti-communist liberal politician as well as a pro-American and pro-British nationalist. His idea of normalizing Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations literally developed from his hostility to Yoshida, who did not seem likely to hand over political clout as promised. And this Hatoyama's attitude incurred fierce emotional opposition from the groups supporting Yoshida. Because political reorganization was in process through the merger of the conservative parties, the Japan-Soviet negotiations repeatedly faced obstacles. It was mocked as "Japan-Japan negotiations."

On December 10, 1954, at a press conference after the Cabinet attestation ceremony, Prime Minister Hatoyama announced the following ⁽²⁾. "There is a rumor that the United States is concerned about my remarks on foreign trade with China and the USSR. But you need not

worry. If the U.S. understands my viewpoint, its anxiety will soon be dissolved. Today the world fears the possibility of a third world war. To avoid such circumstance, it is better to increase personal exchanges and trade with the Communist bloc on mutually acceptable base. If we consider Communist countries as our enemies and do not trade and communicate with them, it would lead to war. To develop closer relations with the Communist bloc, it is better to increase foreign trade and personal exchanges. Once the United States comprehends my concept, there will be no misunderstanding.”

This statement clarified the fact that the Japanese government was ready to improve relations with the USSR for the first time since the termination of the Second World war. However, interestingly enough, Hatoyama’s remarks contained no clause directly mentioning the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. In other words, as soon as he gained political power, he temporarily took less assertive attitude on this pending issue of normalization, unlike the days when he was out of power.

Ironically, the first cabinet member that publicly mentioned the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, known to have a cautious attitude on the normalization issue. On December 11, 1954, the second day of the Hatoyama Cabinet Shigemitsu spoke about the new administration’s foreign policy in his first overseas message as minister of foreign affairs, remarking, “We are hoping to restore normal relations with both China and the USSR, with mutually acceptable conditions, while Japan makes efforts to avoid harm to its basic line of cooperation with the nations in the free world (3).”

The Soviet government saw Japan’s policy change as a chance not to be missed. On the night of December 16, it responded through Radio Moscow, stating, “If the Japanese government is really prepared to normalize diplomatic relations, the Soviet government is ready to consider concrete measures (4).” The immediate response from the Soviets stunned Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.

Interestingly, the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR also had a critical attitude toward this normalization. Vyacheslav Molotov (Вячеслав Молотов), an old Bolshevik, took a

critical view of peaceful coexistence policy that the post-Stalin leadership was trying to promote. Molotov despised the term peaceful coexistence because it gave the impression that the USSR was pleading for peace⁽⁵⁾. Yet he reluctantly agreed with the policy which Georgy Malenkov (Георгий Маленков) and Nikita Khrushchev (Никита Хрущёв) intended to promote for the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations, in order to survive the intensifying power struggle that developed in the Kremlin after Joseph Stalin (Иосиф Сталин) died in 1953. We must not overlook the fact that the previously mentioned announcement by Foreign Minister Molotov on December 16 was couched in more careful tones than Radio Moscow appeal to Japan on December 14, which said, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty will not obstruct the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations." Even though it was a coincidence, the critical attitude of the foreign ministers of both countries had somewhat dampening effects on the normalization talks later.

Section 2 The Domnitsky Note and Dual Diplomacy

Late in December, an instruction from Foreign Minister Molotov reached Acting Chief Andrei Domnitsky (Андрей Домницкий) in the former Soviet mission in Mamiana, Tokyo. Domnitsky was instructed to write a note regarding the normalization in the Russian language, and deliver the note to an appropriate figure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan⁽⁶⁾. Domnitsky tried to approach the Japanese Foreign Ministry. But the Ministry's stance was not to acknowledge the existence of the Soviet mission after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect. So his attempt did not bear fruit.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to receive the Domnitsky note which did not include a date, address, or sender's name. Judging from the Domnitsky note with full of defects, one could see that it was Foreign Minister Molotov who intentionally gave unclear direction to Domnitsky because the Soviet foreign minister was originally opposed to the normalization.

After being confronted with the refusal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Domnitsky

accepted the advice of his old friend Kazuo Fujita, a reporter for Kyodo News and changed his strategy to hand over the note directly to Prime Minister Hatoyama. He made arrangements to have the letter handed directly to the Prime Minister through Arata Sugihara, Prime Minister Hatoyama's private foreign policy adviser, with the help of Kan Majima, secretary-general of the National Council for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union, Shoji Ogata of the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association, and Tsunejiro Hiratsuka, Chairman of the Japan-Russo Fishing Cooperation.

On January 7, 1955, Domnitsky, accompanied by his second secretary, paid a confidential visit to Hatoyama's private residence in Otowa, Tokyo. At that time, Domnitsky proposed, "We would like to finish the legal state of war between USSR and the Japan by a declaration of the end of the war. We would also like to exchange official documents concerning the restoration of diplomatic relations, and mutually send ambassadors, after which we hope to negotiate various pending questions concerning territory, trade, war criminals as well as Japan's entry into the United Nations⁽⁷⁾. Prime Minister Hatoyama instantly agreed with Domnitsky, who proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations under the Adenauer Formula by deferring the settlement of territorial questions to a later date. Had the USSR set the solution of territorial issues on precondition, Hatoyama, with poor health and shaky political power, would not have been able to easily agree to this proposal.

On January 24, the USSR made a unilateral declaration of the termination of the legal state of war with West Germany. On the same day, the House of Representatives was dissolved in Japan. On the following day, over the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Domnitsky again visited Prime Minister Hatoyama's private residence in the strictest secrecy, and finally succeeded in handing over the Domnitsky note to Hatoyama. Prime Minister Hatoyama had his own intention. Hatoyama was facing difficulties in office with minority party, and was anxious to expand the number of his party's seats in the Diet. Foreseeing the general election, Hatoyama thought that he could be very advantageous in the election if he publicly showed the Japanese his desire to squarely work on the restoration of Japan-Soviet relations. For this reason he made a bold decision to accept the Domnitsky note.

Although neither date of issue nor sender's name was clearly written in the Domnitsky note, the intention to start negotiations for the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations, either in Moscow or in Tokyo, was mentioned. After accepting the Domnitsky note, Hatoyama modified the cautious attitude that he had held since gaining political clout, and became eager to achieve the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations by his own hand. The Japanese general public welcomed Hatoyama's decision which would put an end to the legal state of the war between Japan and the USSR. While the majority of Japanese citizens judged that the settlement of the territorial problem would take quite a long time, they demanded a quick return of the internees from Siberia.

In contrast to Prime Minister Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu changed his initial attitude toward the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations, and took a prudent viewpoint instead. However, when front-page newspaper articles concerning the Domnitsky note, caused a sensation in Japan, Shigemitsu reluctantly took a step. He instructed Renzo Sawada, representative of the Japanese mission for the United Nations, to confirm with Arkady Sobolev (Аркадий Соболев), the USSR's United Nations representative whether the Domnitsky note reflected the official intentions of the Soviet government. An instantaneous response came from Sobolev confirming that it was authentic and that the note correctly reflected the intention of the Soviet government.

Section 3 Silent Political Coup

This ended the confusion about the Domnitsky note. Opinion clashed during the general election campaign as to the normalization issue between the forces one seeking a fast agreement and ones calling for a prudent attitude. Diplomatic discussions were scheduled to be carried out between Japan and the USSR about the location for normalization talks. On February 8, the Kremlin was struck by a "silent political coup." Premier Malenkov lost his position in the power struggle against First Secretary Khrushchev. Minister of Defense Nikolai Bulganin (Николай

Булганин) accepted the designation of Khrushchev as the next premier⁽⁸⁾. Bulganin spoke English, French and German in addition to Russian, and was a sociable figure whose appointment was welcomed in western. General Georgy Zhukov (Георгий Жуков) took the new post of minister of defense.

At that time, the central figures supporting First Secretary Khrushchev were Vice-Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan (Анастас Микоян) and newly appointed Premier Bulganin. Foreign Minister Molotov, who was critical of Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence diplomacy, was exempted from dismissal at this point.

After the "silent political coup", First Secretary Khrushchev's influence became stronger. But the foundation of his power was still not rock solid precisely because Malenkov, who had been demoted to vice-premier, was vigilantly seeking a chance to make a comeback and was calling on Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich (Лазарь Каганович) and others to join him. Under such circumstances, Khrushchev set the direction of foreign policy, although he had to consult, bargain and adjust in the Soviet Communist Party Politburo, the Presidium of the Central Committee, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In the case of the negotiations for normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations, the following members were among others involved: First Secretary Khrushchev, Premier Bulganin, Foreign Minister Molotov, Minister of Fisheries Aleksandr Ishkov (Александр Ичшков), First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko (Андрей Громыко), Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Nikolai Fedorenko (Николай Федоренко), Plenipotentiary Yakov Malik (Яков Малик). But it was Khrushchev who made the final decision. In spite of the opposition of Foreign Minister Molotov, the USSR determined the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria under the condition of neutrality. Khrushchev played the central role in this foreign policy decision-making process.

Section 4 The Initiation of the London Peace Talks

After many twists and turns the two countries settled on London as the place for peace talks.

The first meeting of the peace talks was held in the Soviet embassy in London on June 1, 1955. The Soviet side appointed Malik, ambassador in Britain at that time, as its plenipotentiary. Plenipotentiary Malik was considered as an influential figure like First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. He was one of the leading authorities on Japanese affairs in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and had held the position of Soviet Ambassador to Japan during World War II. In the words of Shunichi Matsumoto, a Japanese plenipotentiary in the London peace talks, the Soviet government appointed Malik as plenipotentiary because Matsumoto had been appointed Japan's chief negotiator. During World War II, when Matsumoto held the position of Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Malik was the Soviet Ambassador in Japan. After the war, when Matsumoto was the first Japanese ambassador to Britain, Malik was the Soviet ambassador to Britain. Because of such background they knew each other since the 1940s. Japanese mass media showed a favorable reaction to Malik's appointment to the position of plenipotentiary, since he had played important roles in the settlement of the first Berlin crisis of 1948-49 and in the 1953 case-fire of the Korean War. The Japanese mass media were pleased to learn that Gromyko, who was nicknamed "Mr. Net (Her)," was not nominated as the chief negotiator.

In the Soviet negotiation team, excluding Plenipotentiary Malik and Counselor of Soviet Embassy in Britain Sergei Tikhvinsky (Сергей Тихвинский), the remaining nine members were directly dispatched from Moscow, and most were either Japan experts or treaty specialists ⁽⁹⁾. This lineup reflected the eagerness of the Soviet side for the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations.

As already mentioned, the USSR side initially hoped to promote the normalization of diplomatic relations under the Adenauer Formula, and Prime Minister Hatoyama also agreed with this formula. But Hatoyama was obliged to compromise under pressure from the opposition parties due to his unstable political foundation. And he was forced to accept the principle that Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations would be established only after the pending questions were settled, which meant that negotiations in London would start with the aim of concluding a Japan-Soviet peace treaty.

At the outset of the initial session on June 3, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto stated, "Negotiations shall be allowed to take a long time, so let's talk things over at leisure." Plenipotentiary Malik replied, "These negotiations will conclude in a couple of months ⁽¹⁰⁾," Plenipotentiary Matsumoto, who had no trump cards, took charge scheduled for negotiations while carefully watching the development of the forthcoming Geneva Summit Meeting of July 1955 as well as the course of the Soviet-West German negotiations which had already started unofficially.

Soviet negotiators are famed for their tactics, such as playing the "waiting game tactics," using "salami tactics" and "repetition tactics." Negotiations with the USSR generally extended for a long period of time. But the tendency of the USSR to take very quick action when the best opportunity for it has arrived is not generally known. The cases of the Austrian State Treaty, concluded in May 1955, and of the normalization of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the USSR, achieved in September 1955, are unquestionable proofs that the USSR sometimes made swift diplomatic moves to end a skirmish. First Secretary Khrushchev considered the negotiations with Japan as such a case of a short-term decisive one.

Khrushchev initially prepared three cards in order to quickly implement the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. The first was to release Japanese internees in the USSR in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Secondly, the USSR would not employ its veto power regarding Japan's affiliation with the United Nations. The third card was the transfer of the lesser Kuriles, i.e., the Habomais and Shikotan, to Japan. Khrushchev seemed to have calculated that when these three cards were entangled with the goal of normalizing diplomatic relations, and when linkage tactics were skillfully used, Japan would be sure to comply promptly with the restoration of diplomaticities.

Together with these three cards, Khrushchev used de-linkage tactics to avoid entangling relationships with third countries in the negotiations. In other words, the USSR did not obstinately demand the conditions, such as Japan's separation from the San Francisco system, or a breach of treaties, like the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Japan-China Peace Treaty. The USSR did not intend to breach or emasculate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,

Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950 in exchange for achieving the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. In the final analysis, Soviet attitude toward Japan is considered as the logical conclusion of Khrushchev's diplomacy that nations with different social systems could peacefully co-exist.

Also it is noteworthy at this juncture that the USSR used dividing tactics to achieve the establishment of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. These tactics, used by Khrushchev at that time, were the most typical Soviet strategy. It attempted to widen the gap between pros and cons and lead the negotiation in an advantageous way by consistently approaching the pros. In most cases, such as the transfer of the Domnitsky note, determination of the site for peace talks, and Hatoyama's visit to Moscow, the Soviets did not deal with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which had a cautious attitude toward the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. Instead, they sought to contact the pro-Prime Minister Hatoyama groups. The foreign policy of the Hatoyama cabinet was criticized as "dual diplomacy" because there was advocating Prime Minister on one hand, and conservative Foreign Minister on the other hand. Moscow's dividing tactics increased the tension between the two sides; the result was a weakening of Japan's position vis-à-vis the USSR in the negotiation.

As the Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué of October 1954 clearly illustrates, First Secretary Khrushchev actively tried to achieve the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan, without keeping pace with the Chinese side. The USSR hurried to restore the diplomatic ties with Japan, and presented the draft of the Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty at the third session of the London peace talks on June 14, 1955⁽¹¹⁾. The Soviet draft included the following: (1) termination of the legal state of war between Japan and the USSR; (2) Japan's confirmation of Soviet sovereignty in South Sakhalin and on the Kurile Islands; (3) Japan's prohibition from joining a military alliance; (4) demilitarization of the Soya, Nemuro, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits, and the guarantee of free navigation for Soviet warships in Japan's major straits; (5) Soviet support Japan's affiliation to the United Nations; (6) mutual non-interference in internal affairs; (7) mutual abandonment of reparation claims, and (8) conclusion of a Japan-Soviet trade agreement. In accordance with Plenipotentiary Matsumoto, Foreign Minister Molotov prepared

the Soviet draft of the peace treaty on the basis of Gromyko's amendment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty made public at the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951. The main difference between the draft and Gromyko's proposal for amendment was that provision to apply limitations to Japan's self-defense was left out from the outset in the Soviet peace treaty draft presented at the London talks.

On the basis of the *Izvestia (Известия)* article dated November 22, 1954, and Domnitsky's statement at a press conference in late January of 1955, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto was convinced that the USSR intended to normalize Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations after the Soviet side had accepted the existing of Japan-U.S. Security System. And in his analysis the provision prohibiting Japan from participating in military treaties was incorporated into the Soviet draft of peace treaty for the sake of diplomatic maneuvering. On the other hand, the Soviet demanded Japan to exclude American warships from Japan and the surrounding sea surprised Japanese side. According to Matsumoto, Plenipotentiary Malik stated, "this matter will be settled once the territorial problem is solved." Importantly, the Soviet draft of the Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty did not mention anything about the repatriation of Japanese internees.

The main agendas for the Japan-Soviet negotiations were (1) the Northern Territories, and (2) the repatriation of internees. Plenipotentiary Matsumoto demanded the return of all the territories that USSR forces had seized from Japan as well as the repatriation of all Japanese internees before the normalization. Plenipotentiary Malik refuted that the sovereignty of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands had already been settled by various international documents. He defended the Soviet position by referring to the Yalta Agreement, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and General MacArthur's Order No. 1. Malik asserted that Japan, as a defeated nation, had no qualification whatsoever to press for the return of territory under the Soviet control.

What kinds of arguments were exchanged between Japan and the USSR concerning the early repatriation of internees to Japan, the topic most strongly emphasized by the Japanese side? As the top-priority issue taking precedence over all other pending questions,

Plenipotentiary Matsumoto persistently urged the Soviet side to immediately send the internees home, apart from the question of the peace treaty, in conformity with humanism or philanthropy advocated by Prime Minister Hatoyama. Implementation of the early repatriation of internees was the earnest desire of all the Japanese, namely, not only those wishes for early normalization but also those cautious about the restoration of diplomatic ties with the USSR.

The Japanese government conducted a survey on families with interned family members. As of May 1, 1955, there were 1,363 persons whose names were identified and whose whereabouts were confirmed on the Soviet mainland, in addition to 89 on the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, giving a total of 1,452 persons. There were 9,500 in the continental part of the Soviet Union whose names were identified but whose condition was unknown, and 1,779 on the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin for a total of 11,279 persons. Adding together amounted to a grand total of 12,731 persons⁽¹²⁾.

Regarding the Japanese demand that the USSR should quickly repatriate all internees even before the normalization of diplomatic relations, Plenipotentiary Malik repulsed, stating that the repatriation of Japanese internees had already ended by early 1950, and he insisted that the remaining 1,016 Japanese servicemen and 357 civilians were all war criminals; therefore the only way to have them return home would be through an amnesty granted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet caucus after diplomatic relations were restored. Malik insisted that he could not agree with the idea of separating the normalization of diplomatic relations from the question of the repatriation of internees. Thus the stance of the two countries did not at all coincide⁽¹³⁾. Consequently, the repatriation of internees was delayed, causing much annoyance among the repatriation groups. Such groups included the General Headquarters of the National Campaign for the Rescue of Retained Japanese (Chairman Hideji Masutani) constituted mainly by members of the families of persons missing in Soviet territory, the National Council of Organization of Families of Japanese Internees (Chairman Hachiro Arita) which was focused on the return home of survivors, and the Association to Promote the Repatriation of Compatriots from the USSR (Chairman Moriichi Hasegawa). At the 4th meeting with Plenipotentiary Malik on June 21, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto strongly demanded that the USSR present a list of the

1,016 servicemen and 357 civilians retaining in the USSR. Yet the response from Plenipotentiary Malik was by no means a favorable one.

Section 5 Khrushchev's Miscalculation

In the London peace talks, the stance of Japan and the USSR regarding the problem of repatriation of Japanese internees and the northern territory problem was widely apart. From July 18 to July 23, the U.S., the USSR, Britain and France held summit meeting in Geneva concerning the Indochina War (Franco-Vietnamese War) armistice.

The US President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, both of whom had taken a critical attitude toward the USSR, attended among others the summit meeting held under the leadership of First Secretary Khrushchev. From the Soviet side, Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin participated in the summit meeting. Also, Foreign Minister Molotov, who had been critical of peaceful coexistence diplomacy, yielded to Khrushchev's persuasion, and joined the summit meeting. Plenipotentiary Malik joined the Soviet delegation as a military adviser. The Geneva summit meeting was the first East-West conference since the Potsdam Conference of July 1945.

Although no agreement was signed at the Geneva summit meeting, it made a certain contribution to easing the tensions between the East-West camps. Before the Geneva Summit meeting, Khrushchev had considered Secretary of State Dulles as his enemy because of Dulles anti-communist standpoint; but after the summit meeting he began to respect the US secretary of state, who was calm and never tried to go beyond certain limits⁽¹⁴⁾.

In the 8th session on July 26, a bright sign was seen in the negotiations for normalization of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations. On that occasion, Plenipotentiary Malik notified Plenipotentiary Matsumoto that 16 "Japanese war criminals" who had finished their prison terms in the USSR would be repatriated immediately through the International Red Cross. And Malik handed over a list of "war criminals" scheduled to be released. In addition, Malik

also promised to deliver a complete list of 1,016 interned former servicemen and 357 civilian internees in the near future.

Plenipotentiary Matsumoto cleverly took into account the evolving international circumstances in which intensity between the East and the West was easing after the Geneva Summit meeting, and asked Plenipotentiary Malik to hold an unofficial session. On August 4, at a meeting on the lawn of the Soviet Embassy in Britain, Plenipotentiary Malik made an astonishingly accommodating statement that if all of the remaining problems were settled the USSR would have no objection to handing over the lesser Kurile Islands to Japan. Furthermore, he states that if the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was purely defensive by nature as Japan explained, the Soviet Union would drop the demand for its abolition⁽¹⁵⁾. These crucial concessions were made so that the USSR would succeed in obtaining the consent of Japan for conclusion of the peace treaty. The new Soviet stance was reconfirmed at the 10th Japan-Soviet official session on August 9.

Britain had previously observed that the USSR would probably make some conciliatory moves toward Japan regarding the territory problem because the peace talks had been instigated by the Soviets. Declassified Soviet diplomatic documents reveal, the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee instructed Plenipotentiary Malik to agree to concede the Habomais and Shikotan islands to Japan⁽¹⁶⁾. During the London peace talks, Khrushchev was involved in fierce power struggle. The foundation of his political clout was not strong enough. Therefore, so returning two small islands was the maximum concession he could afford then. It was also most likely that Khrushchev presumed that when the Habomais and Shikotan were transferred to Japan, the Japanese side never failed to quickly agree to conclude Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty. The Soviet leader seemed to have considered that the reversion of two islands would significantly contribute to the development of Japan-Soviet good neighbourly relations. And that would also be a hint to the US, which continued to occupy Okinawa and Ogasawara islands and that it would help to greatly enhance both national consciousness and anti-American sentiment among Japanese people, and would eventually result in achieving the withdrawal of US forces from Japan. For Khrushchev, his policy to hand over two islands to Japan meant

“killing two birds with one stone.” He contended that both the Habomais and Shikotan islands had little military and economic value⁽¹⁷⁾. On the other hand, he was very unfavorable about transferring the larger islands, i.e., Kunashiri and Etorofu, which could significantly lower the dignity of the USSR, as the “victorious nation.” If the Soviet leader promised to transfer both islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan, this would never fail to cause a furious opposing reaction from the military authorities and anti-Khrushchev groups, putting him in danger of losing his power. Besides, he feared it might lead to additional territorial problems between the USSR and other countries, opening a “Pandora’s box,” which could markedly weaken the Soviet position. In the words of former Japanese ambassador Kinya Niizeki, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov objected to the decision by Khrushchev, who contended the necessity to transfer the two islands to Japan to restore diplomat relations with Japan⁽¹⁸⁾.

In any case, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto, who elicited the conciliatory offer, asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for further instructions. An instruction arrived from Tokyo directing him to continue territorial negotiations.

In the 14th session, held on September 6, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto informed his counterpart Malik of the instruction from Tokyo. Japan’s response was a big surprise to the Soviet side. Malik became outraged and insisted that the Soviet side could not absolutely accept Japan’s position. Concerning the transfer of the Habomais and Shikotan, he added such a new condition that Japan must not set up military bases on these islands. Thus, the Japan-Soviet negotiations reached a deadlock.

Khrushchev originally intended to mark diplomatic achievements by promptly accomplishing the normalization of Japan-USSR relations as well as that between West Germany and the USSR. He was planning to take advantage of the thaw in the international relation after the Geneva Summit meeting and the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. And he was anxious to take these results with him when he attended the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party scheduled for February 1956. However, his hopes were completely dashed. Malik was instructed to leave Britain for a while in order to attend a session of the UN General Assembly, and the Japan-Soviet peace talks in London entered a hiatus of over four months after

the meeting of September 13.

Around this occasion, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany visited the USSR and started negotiations for the normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations with First Secretary Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin,⁽¹⁹⁾. At the meeting on September 12, Khrushchev asserted, “If diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany are established, we will immediately exchange ambassadors. But German prisoners of war captured during the war are criminals who killed our innocent Russians. If I let these criminals return to Germany, what will the Soviet people think about that?” Adenauer furiously refuted Khrushchev’s remarks, criticizing, “You must not identify German citizens with Hitler and Nazism.” The negotiations reached a deadlock, and Adenauer ordered his negotiation team to return home. In view of a strong reaction of the German side, the Soviet leadership suddenly softened its tone. Bulganin promised, “They will start returning home eight days after the establishment of diplomatic relations.” As a result, negotiations for the normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations promptly settled. On the following day, a joint communiqué was signed. However, it is noteworthy here that despite the request by the German side, the release of West German prisoners of war was not clearly stated in the joint communiqué⁽²⁰⁾. Instead it took the form of a verbal promise between Premier Bulganin and Chancellor Adenauer. As a consequence of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Soviet Union and West Germany, 8,877 out of the 9,626 German prisoners of war interned in the USSR were allowed to go home. Yet the issue of remaining German internees was still left unsolved.

The normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations confirmed that the USSR employed a “Two Germanies” policy at that time. It should also be noted that Germany violated the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact of 1939 and attacked the USSR. This was totally different from the case of the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, in which the USSR violated the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact of 1941 and participated in the war against Japan.

After the normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations, First Secretary

Khrushchev concluded a protocol with Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen of Finland, concerning the return of the USSR's Porkkala naval base to Finland, to improve the bilateral relationship.

As for the Japan-Soviet peace talks, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto had returned to Japan because the London negotiations were in recess due to Malik's attendance at the UN General Assembly. While Japan-Soviet negotiations were interrupted, the internees repatriation acceleration groups and people involved in fisheries actively held nation-wide rallies and street demonstrations. They presented petitions to Prime Minister Hatoyama and Plenipotentiary Matsumoto and pressed for the immediate resumption of the peace talks. Doubtlessly the normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic ties had the effect of encouraging Japanese citizens to raise their voices and call for the prompt achievement of the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations.

From September 2 to September 21 for the purpose of creating a desirable atmosphere for the development of Japan-Soviet negotiations, First Secretary Khrushchev invited a Japanese delegation. To Moscow Tokutaro Kitamura of the Democratic Party led this delegation consisting of 37 bi-partisan members of the National Diet. Khrushchev and Bulganin met the delegation in the Kremlin⁽²¹⁾.

Khrushchev told the Japanese delegation, "USSR and West Germany established diplomatic relations after negotiations for only five days. However in the London peace talks Plenipotentiaries Matsumoto and Malik did nothing but drink tea." Thus, he directly expressed his dissatisfaction that the negotiations had been adjourned. He added that when diplomatic ties were established, the USSR would quickly release the Japanese internees. And he emphasized the importance of early restoration of diplomatic relations under the Adenauer Formula.

Interestingly enough, around this occasion the former Soviet mission's Acting Chief Domnitsky secretly sent an invitation to Hatoyama, urging the Japanese Prime Minister to visit the USSR before long following sult of Adenauer so as to end the legal state of war between Japan and the USSR. But Prime Minister Hatoyama did not show any positive reaction to this idea because the moves to merge conservative parties was in full swing, and he had absolutely no spare time to favorably respond amidst the tense domestic political situation.

On November 15, the unification of conservative parties was implemented. The newly inaugurated Liberal-Democratic Party raised the restoration of four northern islands in dispute and the immediate release of Japanese internees as its party goals. Pro-American and anti-communist forces including the Yoshida's group entered the ruling party through the unification of conservative parties. Consequently, achieving the normalization of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations, at which Prime Minister Hatoyama was eager to realize, grew increasingly elusive. But importantly in this situation, the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations became the earnest wish of Prime Minister Hatoyama.

On December 15, the Soviet government exercised its veto and flatly rejected Japan's application to join the United Nations. This made Japan to keenly realize the disadvantages due to the absence of the diplomatic relations with the USSR. The number of Japanese fishing vessels captured by the Soviet Union in the northern seas increased sharply.

In late December, the Khabarovsk (Хабаровск) incident occurred⁽²²⁾. Japanese internees refused to work in protest against the situation where sick persons and the elderly were rounded up for labor. The Soviet side punished them in February of the next year by reducing the amount of their food. But the internees stood up against the Soviet authorities by going on a hunger strike. The incident was settled in following March. Japanese internees won some progress, such as improvement of food conditions and an agreement that the sick did not need to come out for labor.

In late January 1956, through Rensaku Onishi, President of Hokuyo Fisheries (Northern Seas Fisheries), and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ichiro Kono, Domnitsky confidentially approached Prime Minister Hatoyama over the head of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Domnitsky proposed to restore diplomatic relations quickly under the Adenauer Formula by declaring the end of the legal state of the war, repatriating internees, exchanging ambassadors, and later carrying out negotiations concerning the pending questions of territory, commerce, and fisheries. But, again, this proposal did not bear fruit.

Yet Domnitsky's behind-the-scenes maneuvering continued; he actively tried to contact Kono, who was Prime Minister Hatoyama's right-hand man and had risen in the

political world as an influential person. Kono had strong support from people involved with the northern fishing circles. It was Kono who tenaciously insisted on the importance of an early consumption of Japan-Soviet negotiations.

A series of words and actions by the Soviet side in the period when the London negotiations were interrupted reflected the policy of Khrushchev. He wished to achieve the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan quickly by switching to the Adenauer Formula when the negotiations reached a deadlock.

On January 7, 1956, after a four-month hiatus, Plenipotentiary Malik had fulfilled his duties in attendance at the UN General Assembly, and the London peace talks re-opened. Malik reiterated the previous statement that the Soviet government could not release Japanese internees unless a Japan-Soviet peace treaty was signed and the Supreme Soviet granted an special amnesty to “Japanese war criminals.” The negotiations for the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations were interrupted again, for Malik left Britain to attend the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

At the Party Congress, First Secretary Khrushchev emphasized the importance of peaceful coexistence diplomacy and the diversification of methods to achieve socialism. In his secret speech, he bitterly denounced Stalin for his terror politics. However, he did not utter any word of blame concerning Stalin’s foreign policy inclusive of the Yalta Agreement. In this conjunction, it should be noted that at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party Domitry Shepilov (Дмитрий Шепилов), Central Committee Secretary and concurrently the editor in chief of Soviet newspaper *PRAVDA* (*Правда*), accused Foreign Minister Molotov of taking a critical attitude toward Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence policy including the normalization of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Japan ⁽²³⁾.

Molotov, who also objected to the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, was finally forced to resign just before the top-level conference between First Secretary Khrushchev and President Josip Tito (Јосип Тито). Khrushchev appointed Shepilov to the post of minister of foreign affairs.

After the 20th Party Congress, Plenipotentiary Matsumoto sounded out

Plenipotentiary Malik about whether or not he had brought back a “present” from Moscow. But Malik did not show any concession plan whatsoever. Faced with a complete stalemate, plenipotentiaries agreed to close the peace talks “indefinitely” after the 23rd official session on March 20.

Section 6 The Japan-Soviet Fisheries Talks

On the following day, the Soviet government reported through Radio Moscow the decision of the Soviet Council of Ministers (Совет Министров СССР) that since the salmon and trout resources in the northern seas were facing exhaustion, the USSR set up a provisionally controlled water area surrounded by the so-called “Bulganin Line.” This line enclosed the wide area of the high seas adjoining the Soviet territorial and the seas west of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. For a period until an appropriate treaty was concluded with Japan, the Soviet government would henceforth permit Japanese fishermen with special permission from the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries to operate in the aforementioned waters ⁽²⁴⁾.

On February 11, 1956, Radio Moscow clarified that the Soviet Council of Ministers had issued an instruction to the authorities in charge to investigate the situation and propose emergency measures on the ground that salmon and trout resources were, in danger of extinction due to large-scale reckless fishing by Japanese fleets in the northern seas area. This announcement stunned fishermen circles in Japan especially because they were preparing for the spring fishing season by forming 19 fleets, the largest number since the end of the Second World War. This expansion was advocated by Kono, the minister of agriculture, forestry and fisheries.

As already mentioned, Khrushchev had prepared three cards to achieve quick normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. But those cards did not have the expected efficacy. On the contrary, the peace talks finally reached a complete deadlock. In view of such a situation, Khrushchev brought out the “disciplinary card” of fishing control on the high seas in

order to end the deadlock. Because of the close relationship between the fishing industry and the Hatoyama Cabinet, particularly with Kono, Hatoyama's right-hand man, the "disciplinary card" proved to be quite effective. Thereafter, the negotiations for the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations progressed exclusively at the pace set by the USSR. The negotiation stage was changed from London to Moscow.

On April 21, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kono, in charge of managing the fisheries problem, received a petition from the fishing industry in Japan; it requested him to obtain consent from the Soviet authorities so that Japanese fishermen could start fishing in time for the fishing season. Under the instruction of Prime Minister Hatoyama, Kono flew to Moscow as Japan's chief negotiator. Conservative reluctantly approved this trip with the condition that he was not to negotiate on the normalization, but only to discuss about the fisheries issue⁽²⁵⁾.

On April 29, Soviet-Japan fisheries negotiations started at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow where the Kono delegation was staying. Because the fishing season was close at hand, he planned to accomplish a speedy achievement with the USSR. On the first official session, he quickly showed the Japanese draft on the Japan-Soviet Fisheries Convention and the Sea Rescue Agreement. There were no particular problems with the Sea Rescue Agreement, and Japan and the USSR were in full accord. In contrast, negotiations about the Japan-Soviet Fisheries Convention did not go smoothly. The Soviet Minister of Fisheries Ishkov insisted that because the two countries were still legally in a state of war, the USSR had no obligation whatsoever to apply the rule of freedom of the high seas to Japan. In addition, to Kono's great surprise, he showed a plan to include almost the entire area around Japan from the Bering Sea to the southern end of Kyushu in the applicable scope, drastically expanding the area covered by the Bulganin Line⁽²⁶⁾.

Under these circumstances, Chief negotiator Kono decided to entrust the preparation of the Fisheries Convention to a special committee, and he devoted himself to conclude a provisional agreement only for the 1956 fiscal year, energetically carrying out negotiations in hopes of enabling Japanese fishermen to sail out and start fishing. But Ishkov flatly refused,

asserting that he could not conclude a provisional agreement prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations. He did not comply with Kono's request.

Concluding that his talks with Ishkov would be unproductive, Kono decided to meet with Premier Bulganin. His request was accepted and Kono had talks with the Soviet leadership on May 9. From Japan, only Kono attended the meeting, while Premier Bulganin, Fisheries Minister Ishkov, and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Fedorenko attended from the Soviet side; Nikolai Adyrkhaev (Николай Адирхаев), who had served as the interpreter in the London peace talks, was in charge of interpreting.

In his talks with Kono, Premier Bulganin spoke authoritatively, asserting that, "When your country won the Russo-Japanese war, it took away Sakhalin and the rights and interests of fisheries from our side. But this time, your country was defeated, so you must listen to what we say." Kono refuted this. As a result of tense negotiations, he finally managed to obtain the consent of the Soviet side along the lines that the USSR would cooperate and conclude a provisional fisheries agreement just for the 1956 fiscal year, with the condition that negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations would be resumed by July 31⁽²⁷⁾.

The Japan-Soviet Fisheries Convention, the Sea Rescue Agreement as well as the provisional agreement on fishing in the 1956 fiscal year were signed by Fisheries Minister Ishkov and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kono, on May 15. The provisional agreement came into effect as soon as it was signed. Thus, the Japanese fishing fleets were to sail out barely in time for the fishing season. The Conventions stated above were to come into effect immediately after diplomatic relations were established. However, various criticisms arose in Japan regarding Kono's negotiations with the USSR. At the meeting with Premier Bulganin, held in the interior of the Kremlin, Kono did not allow an interpreter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to accompany him. He alone carried out the negotiations with the USSR; therefore a secret promise rumor that Kono might have agreed to abandon the four northern islands, started to be whispered in the political circles in Japan. Yet, as clarified at a later date by N.Adyrkhaev, who attended the meeting as an interpreter, there was no secret deal concerning the northern territorial problem⁽²⁸⁾; It should be stated here that the secret

promise actually proposed by Kono to the Soviet side was to resume the negotiations for normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations by July 31. In the intervals between negotiations, Kono visited the officers' concentration camp in Ivanovo (Иваново) city. and met with Major General Otozo Yamada, former Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army⁽²⁹⁾.

Section 7 The First Moscow Peace Talks

After Kono returned to Japan, there was difficulty in selecting a plenipotentiary for the upcoming Japan-Soviet peace talks in Moscow. Unexpectedly, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who had stressed that Japan should take a prudent attitude toward the USSR was placed in charge as chief delegate. He was bitterly blamed for the breakdown of the negotiations and was pressed to take the responsibility.

Because a minister-level figure took the post of the chief delegate on the Japanese side, the USSR appointed a high-ranking figure as the chief negotiator for the Moscow table. Shigemitsu's counterpart was Shepilov, who had been singled out by Khrushchev to become the foreign minister, replacing Molotov, just before President Tito of Yugoslavia visited the USSR. Shepilov was well versed in diplomatic matters. When he was appointed minister of foreign affairs, he held the position of editor in chief of the *Pravda* newspaper.

The first official meeting of the resumed peace talks was held the Spiridonovska Palace in Moscow on July 31. This was the same location where the intensive negotiations for normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations were previously conducted. The Soviet delegation for the Moscow peace talks with Japan included Foreign Minister Shepilov, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Fedorenko and Malik, who rushed from London to Moscow to participate as a delegation member. In contrast to the London peace talks, the Moscow negotiations were held in the increased international tension. The Suez canal crisis occurred when the Moscow talks started. The deterioration of the political situation took place in Poland and Hungary. Therefore, there was a tense atmosphere in the talks coherently.

At the outset of the Moscow peace talks, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu strongly advocated the propriety of Japan's demand for the return of the four northern islands in spite of citing various treaties. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov gave a detailed refutation and sharply criticized Shigemitsu.

Shigemitsu also demanded the release of Japanese internees at the earliest possible date, and stressed that the USSR should notify Japan of the survey results concerning the 11,177 missing persons. He asserted that the settlement of the repatriation problem would help to bring reconciliation to people of both Japan and the USSR, and would surely pave the way to the establishment of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. To this, Shepilov replied that he was expecting to soon send back 114 Japanese, approximately 10% of Japanese internees⁽³⁰⁾. On July 12, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet approved the release of 85 Japanese among the "Japanese war criminals", who had been found guilty and sentenced by the Soviet judicial authorities, before their term of servitude was completed⁽³¹⁾.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu aggressively pressed for the return of the four northern islands, but there was no progress. As a last resort, following the precedent set by Kono during the fisheries talks in the spring of 1956, Shigemitsu asked to confer with the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side agreed to Shigemitsu's proposal. However, in unofficial talks with Shigemitsu on August 10 in the Kremlin, Khrushchev stated, "Concerning the territory problem, we have no intention of going beyond the transfer of the Habomais and Shikotan," and, "The Soviet stance concerning territory is final and cannot be changed." He was firmly determined not to change his attitude. But Shigemitsu refused to give up. Khrushchev tried to cope with the situation by remarking that if Japan would acknowledge the principle that Kunashiri and Etorofu islands were irrevocably settled as the Soviet territory, "I would like you to talk with Shepilov about details within the scope that will cause no actual harm to Japan and the USSR."

Shigemitsu, who pinned his last hopes to the words of Khrushchev, prepared a couple of compromise plans, and attended separate talks with Foreign Minister Shepilov on the following day. But in the talks with Shigemitsu, Shepilov did not agree to any amendment whatsoever. Instead, he stressed that he had to attend the international conference on the Suez

Canal to be held in London. He sent an ultimatum, stressing that he was leaving Moscow on the 14th, and that he urged Shigemitsu to answer by the morning of the 13th whether or not Japan could sign a peace treaty on the Soviet terms ⁽³²⁾. In addition, the Soviet Foreign Minister once again revived the question regarding the strait navigation rights that the Soviet side had withdrawn in the London peace talks, and stated that the question on strait navigation rights should be clearly stipulated in the text of the Peace Treaty.

Shigemitsu considered that, “If we postpone the negotiations further, we will just impair our dignity and make our stance more disadvantageous, and there is even a possibility of putting the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan in jeopardy.” He concluded that the appropriate step to take was to accept the Soviet proposal as it is, and implement the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. On the night of August 11, he summoned the members of his delegation and announced that Japan should immediately sign the peace treaty on the Soviet terms. However, Matsumoto vigorously opposed and urged him to report to the Japanese government before proceeding to sign the peace treaty.

Section 8 The Second Moscow Peace Talks

Prime Minister Hatoyama did not agree with Shigemitsu’s proposal to immediately conclude a peace treaty on the Soviet terms. He intended to somehow implement the restoration of diplomatic relations, in the form of continuously discussing the territory problem without concluding a peace treaty. He was eager to achieve his goal even if it meant putting his political life at stake. He decided to personally lead the Japanese delegation to the Soviet Union. Despite the vehement opposition of the pro-US groups, he continued his preparations for his trip to Moscow. The prospect of success had to accompany the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations on which he was betting his political life, hoping to achieve this as a splendid finale before he retired gracefully from the political world. Therefore, he instructed the team headed by Shunichi Matsumoto to prepare basic provisions before he visited the USSR.

As a result, the following five provisions were formulated: (1) the termination of the legal state of the war between the two nations; (2) mutual establishment of embassies; (3) immediate repatriation of Japanese internees in the USSR, (4) effectuation of the Japan-Soviet Fishing Convention; and (5) Soviet support for Japan's bid to join the United Nations. These provisions came with the condition that "Negotiations concerning the territorial problem will be continued at a later date ⁽³³⁾."

After confidential talks in Japan among Tikhvinsky, Soviet fishing mission leader in Japan Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kono, and Tatsunosuke Takasaki versed in north seas fisheries issue, the Soviet side gave verbal notice of its overall understanding of the five conditions. But Prime Minister Hatoyama decided to send a letter directly to Premier Bulganin through official diplomat channel in order to check the credibility of the Tikhvinsky statement. The reply from Premier Bulganin, dated September 13th, reached Prime Minister Hatoyama through Tikhvinsky. This was the first direct exchange of letters between the heads of the governments in Japan and the USSR after the end of World War II.

According to the letter of reply from Premier Bulganin, the Soviet Union would agree to the five conditions mentioned in Hatoyama's letter. However, the phrase "Negotiations concerning the territorial problem will be continued at a later date," which was included in the proviso and was the most crucial point for Japan, was completely omitted ⁽³⁴⁾. This reflected the true feelings of the USSR, which was anxious to achieve the speedy normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations without making any pledge at all to Japan concerning the controversial territorial problem. The Soviet reactions regarding the five conditions for Hatoyama's visit to Moscow appeared to be friendly at a glance. But Japan had to pay thorough attention to the Soviet reaction.

The anti-mainstream factions of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party picked up the fact that the phrase "negotiations concerning the territorial problem will be continued at a later date" was not included in Bulganin's letter. Criticizing this point, they furiously objected to Hatoyama's trip to the USSR.

In this tense political situation, Shunichi Matsumoto was hastily dispatched to the

USSR in order to obtain the assurance of the Kremlin leadership on the continuation of talks on the territorial issue after the resumption of diplomatic relations. In Moscow Matsumoto had meetings with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Fedorenko. And Matsumoto finally succeeded in obtaining a very encouraging reply from First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Gromyko. And they exchanged official letters containing the statement that “negotiations inclusive of the territorial problem will be continued after the normalization of diplomatic relations” on September 29⁽³⁵⁾. As a result of the exchange of the Matsumoto-Gromyko Correspondence, the Soviet government accepted all conditions attached by Japan regarding Hatoyama’s trip to the USSR.

On October 2, before his visit to the USSR, Hatoyama gave the following speech. Because of its considerable length, only important excerpts are given here⁽³⁶⁾.

The first reason why I’m strongly insisting on the necessity of normalizing Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations is my insatiable desire for peace. I expect that by normalizing the diplomatic relationship with the USSR, Japan will take the lead and become a bridge between two blocs, playing an important role in the avoidance of war and the achievement of peace. The second reason is to improve Japan’s international position as well as to perfect its independence. I consider it necessary to restore Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations now in order for Japan to join the United Nations, and to strengthen Japan’s status and the right to speak, and to maintain an equal stance vis-à-vis other states. Actually, there are some who are concerned that this will intensify the Bolshevization movement in Japan. But I am convinced that the success or failure of Bolshevization is more closely related to the quality of Japan’s domestic politics rather than to the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR. Having a diplomatic relationship with a Communist country is a completely different matter from accepting communism. As long as the Japanese have self-confidence as the citizens of an independent state, I am convinced that this will in no circumstances cause any problem among them.

More than a decade has passed since the end of the Second World War. Whenever I think of numerous Japanese still interned abroad as well as the feelings of their families, I feel as if my heart would be broken. And this is my third reason for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR. Of course, I will never concede our demands regarding Japan's inherited territory. For us, those responsible for politics, devotion to our land is as irreplaceable as the lives of its citizens. I am determined to exert all my strength to implement the hopes of Japanese citizens for this territory and the goals of our party.

Once the schedule for the Prime Minister's visit to the USSR was determined, Japanese songs were played in the concentration camp in Khabarovsk. The demands to achieve the work norms were much less persistent. And Japanese detainees were able to be hospitalized when they themselves felt it necessary⁽³⁷⁾.

On October 7, the Japanese delegation headed by Prime Minister Hatoyama departed for Moscow by the European route. Premier Bulganin, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Gromyko, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Fedorenko, and Minister of Fisheries Ishkov met Prime Minister Hatoyama at the international airport in Moscow. Lodgings in the Spiridonovka Palace were prepared for Prime Minister Hatoyama and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kono. When Chancellor Adenauer visited the USSR previously, he stayed at the Sovetskaya Hotel. The reception for Prime Minister Hatoyama was much warmer than for Adenauer. Reportedly an elevator was specially installed in the Kremlin for Hatoyama, whose body was partially paralyzed by the hangover of a cerebral hemorrhage. When the Hatoyama delegation landed in Moscow on October 12, the *Izvestia* newspaper contained a long article concerning the resumption of Japan-Soviet negotiations, and reported that there were no insoluble problems remaining between the two countries.

The first meeting of the two national delegations was held on October 13th. Prime Minister Hatoyama, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kono and Shunichi Matsumoto attended as plenipotentiaries for the Japanese delegation. In the Soviet delegation, a

total of five figures, inclusive of First Secretary Khrushchev, First Vice-Prime Minister Mikoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shepilov, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Gromyko, and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Fedorenko, participated as plenipotentiaries.

On October 15, the first official meeting was held in the Kremlin. At the outset, Premier Bulganin stated that he was hopeful of establishing diplomatic relations under the joint declaration formula. And the Japanese side agreed to that. The Soviet side immediately showed its draft of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration that referred to a ratification provision ⁽³⁸⁾. The Soviet draft constituted a preamble and ten articles, and the five conditions, proposed by Prime Minister Hatoyama prior to his own Soviet visit, were clearly stipulated. In addition, a variety of points agreed upon in the London peace talks and the first Moscow peace talks were incorporated. Most importantly, the territorial issue was referred to as, "The two countries agree to continue the negotiations concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty inclusive of the territorial problem after the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and USSR." This was based on the agreement between the governments of Japan and the USSR, which was incorporated in the previously mentioned Matsumoto-Gromyko Correspondence. The strait transit rights problem, about which Japan had been concerned, was excluded from the Soviet draft for the joint declaration. The Soviet side, which was eager to establish diplomatic relations promptly, also submitted its draft for the convention on commerce and navigation.

During the first official talks both sides agreed to launch a subcommittee in line with Premier Bulganin's proposal so as to carry out the clerical work to compose official documents containing the agreed-upon matters concerning the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. Plenipotentiary Gromyko on the Soviet side and Plenipotentiary Matsumoto on the Japanese side respectively took charge of the task.

The Soviet side had agreed to meet with the Hatoyama delegation in Moscow on the basis of the consent to implement the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations by completely shelving the territorial problem. However, an emergency general assembly of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) was convened under pressure from the anti-mainstream factions immediately after Matsumoto's departed for the USSR on September 20. And the

LDP's new party policy concerning Japan-Soviet negotiations was hastily determined. The main points of the new party policy were as follows: (1) immediate and unconditional repatriation of internees; (2) the immediate return of the Habomais and Shikotan; (3) continued negotiation for the restoration of Kunashiri and Etorofu following the normalization of normal diplomatic relations; (4) the observance of the San Francisco Peace Treaty concerning the disposition of other territories ⁽³⁹⁾.

In view of the new party policy, the Japanese side attempted to persuade Khrushchev, willing or not, to incorporate the territorial problem in the text of the joint declaration, in as close accordance with the new party policy. As a result, a series of special Kono-Khrushchev talks were held for a total of three days starting October 16. The talks were truly the climax of the negotiations ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

After the second session of the Kono-Khrushchev talks, a top-level conference was held between Bulganin and Hatoyama. Prime Minister Hatoyama urged Bulganin to conduct a survey on the missing Japanese in the Soviet territory. To this, Bulganin replied, "We will take measures to transfer the interned Japanese including the prisoners of war currently in their service. We agree to the additional request from Japan to search for Japanese who are not included on the list ⁽⁴¹⁾."

Section 9 Signing of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration and the Last Repatriation Ship

After a heated exchange of opinions on the territorial issue in the third session of the Kono-Khrushchev talks, the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration as well as the Japan-Soviet Commerce and Navigation Protocol were signed in the Kremlin on October 19. Premier Bulganin and Foreign Minister Shepilov signed, representing the Soviet side, and Prime Minister Hatoyama, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Kono, and Plenipotentiary Matsumoto signed for the Japanese side. The Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration constituted a

preamble and the following ten provisions⁽⁴²⁾: (1) Ending of legal state of war; (2) restoration of diplomatic and consular relations; (3) Respect for the United Nations Charter and mutual noninterference in internal affairs; (4) support by the USSR for Japan's bid for the United Nations; (5) release and repatriation of Japanese internees and continuation of the survey by the USSR concerning missing Japanese; (6) mutual abandonment of reparations claim rights; (7) quick commencement of negotiation for a foreign trade and commerce treaty or agreement; (8) effectuation of the Japan-Soviet Fishing Convention signed in May 1956; (9) continuation of peace treaty negotiations and transfer of the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan after conclusion of the peace treaty; and (10) regulations concerning ratification of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration.

The Matsumoto-Gromyko Correspondence was officially disclosed in public right after the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was signed. Continuous deliberation concerning the territorial problem was clearly stated in the Matsumoto-Gromyko Correspondence, providing the grounds for continuous deliberation of the northern territorial problem up to the present.

As is already clarified, the repatriation of German captives was not clearly stated in the joint communiqué issued at the time of normalization of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations. In sharp contrast, the repatriation of Japanese internees to their homeland was clearly stipulated in the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, which reads, "All Japanese found guilty and sentenced in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be released and repatriated home once this joint declaration comes into effect. In addition, based on the request by Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall continuously carry out the survey concerning missing Japanese."

The negotiations for Japan-Soviet peace talks finally bore fruit overcoming numerous obstacles. As a result of the signing of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, the legal state of war was brought to an end, long after the termination of the Second World War. And diplomatic relations between the two nations was restored. However, Khrushchev was nowhere to be seen at a splendid party held after the signing ceremony; He had flown to Warsaw for the purpose of containing a threatening political situation in Poland.

The Hatoyama delegation returned to Japan via the US. Prime Minister Hatoyama had already announced his intention to retire gracefully following the implementation of the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. This considerably discouraged the morale of anti-Hatoyama forces ranged against him. And the House of Representatives adopted the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration on November 27, following which the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was passed by the House of Councilors on December 5. On December 12th, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Fedorenko paid a visit to Japan, and the instruments of ratification of the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration and the commerce protocol were exchanged between the two nations.

On December 18, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Japan's application to join the United Nations. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu vowed that Japan would fulfill its duties as a full-fledged UN member nation, and he made a speech at the UN General Assembly, stating that "Japan intends to play the role of a bridge between the East and the West." His speech received a great ovation.

On December 23, near the end of the year, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued a decree of amnesty to Japanese internees based on the realization of the normalization of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations. 20 generals from the former Japanese Army, a chief of the Manchurian police headquarters, a former 2nd class public official equivalent to general and 306 officers were included among the released internees. One of the internees, Maj. Gen. Shigesada Kawagoe, former Chief of staff of the 5th Division of the Kwantung Army, died of a myocardial infarction just before he was due to return home⁽⁴³⁾. On December 26, the last repatriation ship, the Koan Maru, carrying 1,025 internees aboard from Nakhodka (Находка) port, arrived at Maizuru port. Eleven years after being forcibly interned in the USSR following the termination of the Second World War, they finally set foot on the ground of their motherland.

Notes

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- (22) Ichiro Suetsugu, *Sengo e no Chosen*, Rekishi Toshosha, 1981, pp.98-99.
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- (27) *Ibid.*, pp. 33-50.
- (28) N. Adyrhaev, “Kono Ichiro shi to Bulganin tonu Kaidan no ‘Himitsu,’” in *Kyokuto no Shomondai*, Vol. 19, No. 3, June 1990, pp. 178-179. Then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shinsaku Hogen also denied the rumor about a secret deal. See Public Relations Bureau of the Liberal-Democratic Party, (ed.), *Sengo Nihon Seiji no Jitsuroku*, Nagata Shobo, 1976, p. 122.
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- (32) Yoshizawa, (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.
- (33) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
- (34) Premier Bulganin’s personal letter to Prime Minister Hatoyama states, “release and repatriation to Japan of all the Japanese sentenced to punishment in the USSR.” See С. Л. Тихвинский, *Россия-Япония*, Москва, 1996, с.112.
- (35) *Ibid.*, pp. 127-128.
- (36) Kubota, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-127.
- (37) Yasuo Wakatsuki, *Shiberia Horyo Shuyoujo*, Akashi Shoten, 1999, p. 380.
- (38) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-211.
- (39) *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.
- (40) See *Источник*, No.6 (1996), с.116-129, regarding the Soviet version of the minutes of the Kono-Khrushchev talks.
- (41) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147.
- (42) Hiroshi Shigeta and Shoji Suezawa, (eds.), *Nisso Kihon Bunsho Shiriyoshu*, Sekai no Ugokisha, 1988, pp. 151-154.
- (43) Карпов, *op. cit.*, p. 324.